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Retribution, the Evolving Standard of
Decency, and Methods of Execution: The




There exists a curious truce between death penalty advocates and
detractors: both sides agree that lethal injection is the appropriate means
of executing this country's convicted murderers. Ostensibly, the reason
for this agreement is that both detractors and supporters view lethal
injection as the most "humane" means of execution. Detractors favor
lethal injection because it is less painless than alternative methods,
supporters because the more humane the death penalty method, the more
likely the death penalty will remain constitutional. This Article will
argue, however, that his alliance belies an untenable problem in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence: retribution and the evolving standard of
decency have come into direct conflict with regard to methods of
execution.
If the focus of the Eighth Amendment is whether a particular
method of execution involves the "unnecessary or wanton infliction of
pain," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174 (1976), but retribution is a
constitutional rationale for the imposition of the death penalty, the
logical result is an intellectual quagmire. Most illustrative of this
problematic reasoning is Baze v. Rees, in which Justice Stevens wrote
that "requiring that an execution be relatively painless . . . actually
undermines the very premise on which public approval of the retribution
rationale [for the death penalty] rests." 553 U.S. 35, 80 (2013). Baze
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sets a paradoxical standard that highlights the tension between retribution
and the evolving standard of decency. One needs only look to the parade
of horribles touted in cases like State v. Mata and Provenzano v. Moore
to see the result of this Eighth Amendment tension in practice.
What is more, the tension between these competing concepts is not
merely academic: as states turn to new methods of execution in light of
drug shortages, questions will be raised regarding the constitutionality of
those protocols. The tension between retribution and the evolving
standard of decency in method of execution jurisprudence has yet to be
fully explored, but will be the future of death penalty litigation. This
Article will advocate for a modified test for the application of the Eighth
Amendment to methods of execution, based on the concurring opinion of
Justices Thomas and Scalia in Baze. Instead of focusing on the risk of
harm inherent in any mode of capital punishment, the state should be
required only to refrain from causing intentional or reckless harm. This
line of reasoning, although not without flaws, will at least preserve the
popular sentiment in the states (either for or against the death penalty)
while preventing the state from causing unnecessary harm to convicted
murderers.
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There is no likeness or proportion between life, however
painful, and death; and therefore there is no equality
between the crime of murder and the retaliation of it but
what is judicially accomplished by the execution of the
criminal. His death, however, must be kept free from all
maltreatment that would make the humanity suffering in his
person loathsome or abominable.'
INTRODUCTION
Those who oppose the death penalty and those who support its
continued use agree on precious little. However, both sides of the
divisive debate agree on one topic, at least in principle: method of
execution. Both death penalty detractors and supporters find common
ground in the use of lethal injection as the proper method of executing
this country's condemned. Death penalty detractors support the use of
lethal injection as the most "humane" method of execution. Supporters
likely prefer its use because lethal injection, given the evolving standard
of decency test, appears to be the only remaining constitutional method
of execution.
The confluence of thought in favor of lethal injection may appear
harmless, or even a rare gleam of light in an otherwise dark debate. This
Article will argue, however, that this alliance belies an untenable
contradiction in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence: increasing focus on
the risk of pain caused by executions despite the retributive justification
for capital punishment. The alliance exists only because the U.S.
Supreme Court has increasingly focused on the amount of pain caused by
particular methods of execution-a side effect of Trop v. Dulles2 and the
"dignity of man,"3 which has come to mean that the punishment must not
involve the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" and must not be
1. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 198 (W. Hastie trans., T. & T. Clark
1887) (1796-97).
2. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
3. See id at 100.
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grossly disproportionate to the crime.4 As a result, both death penalty
abolitionists and supporters look to the least painful method of
execution, albeit for different reasons. But if retribution remains the
primary justification for the use of the death penalty, that justification
cannot be squared with an increasing focus on reducing the amount of
pain experienced by convicted murderers. Perhaps most illustrative of
this problematic reasoning is one of the concurring opinions in Baze v.
Rees,5 in which Justice Stevens noted that "requiring that an execution be
relatively painless . . . actually undermines the very premise on which
public approval of the retribution rationale [for the death penalty] rests.",
6
Death penalty abolitionists must delight at the strange course of
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and the Court's seeming distaste for
pain in executions. Paradox supports the position that the death penalty
will collapse under its own weight. Of those paradoxes, contradictory
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, which simultaneously commands
humaneness and bases the constitutionality of the death penalty partly on
retributive justice, is perhaps the most egregious. This Article seeks to
explain the yet unexplored implications of the conflict between the
retributive underpinning of death penalty jurisprudence and the evolving
standard of decency test. Because Baze v. Rees applied the evolving
standard of decency to methods of execution for the first time, and left
decidedly more questions unanswered than answered, the conflict will
remain constitutionally relevant for the foreseeable future as litigants
continue to challenge methods of execution as violations of the Eighth
Amendment. The conflict between retribution and the evolving standard
of decency is not merely a theoretical problem-Baze's progeny
introduces a recent post-mortem method-of-execution challenge.7 As
states such as Ohio continue to experiment with new lethal injection
cocktails due to a lack of available drugs,8 the Baze test will necessarily
be stretched to its limits.
Instead of the substantial risk of pain test presented by Chief Justice
Roberts in Baze, this Article will advocate for a modified version of the
4. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
5. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
6. Id. at 80 (Stevens, J., concurring).
7. See Family of Executed Ohio Inmate File Lawsuit To Ban Repeat of Lethal
Injection, GUARDIAN (Jan. 25, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/25/ohio-execution-family-lawsuit-lethal-
injection [hereinafter Ohio Lawsuit To Ban Repeat of Lethal Injection].
8. See Lacking Lethal Injection Drugs, States Find Untested Backups, NAT'L PUB.
RADIo (Oct. 26, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/10/26/241011316/lacking-lethal-




approach voiced by Justices Thomas and Scalia in Baze.9 Instead of
focusing on the risk of harm inherent in any mode of punishment-of
which there must be some-the state should be required only to refrain
from causing intentional or reckless harm.'0 This line of reasoning,
although not without flaws, will at least preserve the popular sentiment in
the states (either for or against the death penalty) while preventing the
state from causing unnecessary harm to convicted murderers.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RETRIBUTION AND
EIGHTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Since Immanuel Kant's Philosophy of Law, retribution has been a
mainstay of criminal law theory, argued over in classrooms and
academic journals for centuries. Retribution remains a fundamental, if
controversial, precept of criminal law theory. Notwithstanding some
ruminations to the contrary, retribution also serves as a constitutional
rationale for many methods of punishment, including the death penalty.
Indeed, with increasing scrutiny on the deterrence and incapacitation
justifications for the death penalty, retribution maintains its relevance,
both theoretically and as a matter of public opinion.
In stark opposition to retributivism stand those who hope to abolish
the death penalty as cruel and unusual. Inconsistencies in death penalty
jurisprudence and justifications provide ammunition for abolitionists in
their fight to eliminate executions altogether. Indeed, some abolitionists
have capitalized on the two sides' agreement over lethal injection as one
of the many inconsistencies making death penalty jurisprudence
unworkable. 11
The noted inconsistencies in applying the Eighth Amendment have
a common source: the jurisprudence of this nation's highest court. The
evolving standard of decency test, and its regard for the dignity of man,
has served to confuse lower courts and legal scholars alike-and has
served no other end than strengthening the argument for the death
penalty's demise.
A. Retribution
The paradox of lethal injection support begins with retribution.
Retribution's long history in philosophical thought and its basis in
constitutional law makes it one of the most widely accepted justifications
9. See Baze, 533 U.S. at 102 (Thomas, J., concurring).
10. See id
11. See Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling
Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About
Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 68 (2002).
2015]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
for punishment and specifically, the death penalty. Retribution is not
naked vengeance or revenge, but rather a mandate for culpability and
proportionality.
1. Basis in Criminal Law Theory
While recounting the entire philosophical history of retribution
would serve only to distract from the primary purpose of this Article, a
brief recitation is necessary to understand the tenets of the philosophy
that have kept retribution at the forefront of the death penalty debate.
Lex talionis-an eye for eye, or the right of retribution-strikes some as
antiquated and even barbaric.1 2 Some modem retributivists have indeed
distanced themselves from the literal interpretation.1 3  But for some
retributivists, the only punishment for the heinous crime of murder is to
extinguish the life of the guilty party.
For the purposes of common law, retributivism was perhaps made
most famous by Immanuel Kant's 1797 work, Philosophy of Law. Kant
notably asserted that the only appropriate punishment for murder was the
death of the offender.14 The principle of equality and right of retaliation
informed Kant's unwavering position on execution.15 The principle of
equality is straightforward: "the pointer of the Scale of Justice is made
to incline no more to one side than the other."16 From this proposition
comes the right of retaliation, which serves as the means to balance the
scale. 
17
Proportionality, long a tenet of retributive justice, finds a solid
foundation in Kant's philosophy. The criminal, in Kant's view, commits
12. For an apt description of the general reaction to lex talionis in application, see
Jeremy Waldron, Lex Talionis, 34 ARIz. L. REv. 25, 25 (1992). Others have posited that
lex talionis, "to the extent that it is a principle," stands as a limit to punishment. See, e.g.,
Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death
Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HA~v. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 407, 475-76
(2005). This position is not necessarily out of line with retributivism, but reasonable
minds can differ about the limits imposed by lex talionis: if one assumes that lex talionis
does create a limit on the punishment that can be lawfully or morally imposed on the
guilty, what is the limit for murder? It is conceivable that the limit is humane execution,
that is, that society cannot also torture the offender or inflict death in the same manner
perpetrated by the offender.
13. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Retribution: The Central Aim of Punishment, 27
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 19, 20 (2003) ("[R]etribution is not lex talionis, the law of
retaliation, or 'an eye for an eye."'); Markel, supra note 12, at 476 ("In any case, one
need not be a retributivist to embrace lex talionis, and an embrace of retributivism need
not entail a commitment to lex talionis.").
14. KANT, supra note 1, at 198.





a crime not only against the victim, but against himself as well. 8 Thus,
one "who[] steals anything makes the property of all insecure; he
therefore robs himself of all security in property."' 9 Depriving the thief
of his property and the benefit of his labor is therefore the thief s
appropriate punishment. In death, Kant found no such proportionality.20
Execution, according to Kant's view, was not precisely proportional to
the crime of murder; execution was only the nearest analog.21
Fundamentally, retributive justice relies on Kant's primary vision of
punishment: "Juridical Punishment can never be administered merely as
a means for promoting another Good either with regard to the Criminal
himself or to Civil Society, but must in all cases be imposed only
because the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a Crime.22
In this way, pure retributivism opposes the utilitarian notion that
criminals may be punished only as a means to an end, namely,
rehabilitation and reentry into society.23
Since the Philosophy of Law, renowned legal and philosophical
theorists from H.L.A. Hart to Michael S. Moore have further refined the
retributive justice model.24 The continuing debate on the efficacy and
relevance of retributivism remains as heated as in the nineteenth century.
Other theories-rehabilitation and deterrence among them-have gone
in and out of vogue. Both of these theories suffer from a significant
dearth of applicable proof.25 In any case, retribution remains a proffered
18. Id. at 197.
19. KANT, supra note 1, at 197.
20. Id. at 198.
21. Id. at 198.
22. Id. at 195.
23. Kant's take on utilitarianism was not generous. Kant wrote:
The penal law is a Categorical Imperative; and woe to him who creeps through.
the serpent-windings of Utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may
discharge him from the Justice of Punishment, or even from the due measure of
it, according to the Pharisaic maxim: 'It is better that one man should die than
that the whole people should perish.' For if Justice and Righteousness perish,
human life would no longer have any value in the world.
Id. at 195-96. Thus, Kantian retributive justice focuses not on the effect on the punished,
or any perceived benefit of incarcerating or incapacitating the offender, but the simple
notion that punishment must be meted out where deserved due to moral culpability.
24. See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed. 2008);
Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND
EMOTIONS 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987); Michael Moore, Victims and
Retribution: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 65 (1999) [hereinafter
Moore, Victims and Retribution].
25. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185 (1976) ("Although some of the
studies suggest that the death penalty may not function as a significantly greater deterrent
than lesser penalties, there is no convincing empirical evidence either supporting or
refuting this view."); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 396 (1972) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting that the Court generally prefers to leave the "unresolved factual
2015]
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26justification for punishment, despite its many detractors. Today,
retribution, although more nuanced, retains most of the Kantian
elements. Retribution demands culpability before punishment and
proportionality in punishment.27 Retributivist justice relies solely on the
moral justification that the guilty require punishment, either for the
benefit of the criminal and victim, or for society as a whole.28
2. The Constitutionality of Retribution as a Justification for
Capital Punishment
Although interesting in its own right, retributivist theory is
irrelevant to the death penalty debate without a basis in constitutional
law. The U.S. Supreme Court has regularly upheld the state's right to
justify punishment with retribution. As Justice Kennedy wrote in
Graham v. Florida,29 "[r]etribution is a legitimate reason to punish."3 °
Despite some rumination to the contrary,3 retribution remains one of the
three generally accepted constitutional justifications for punishment.32
Until the concurring opinions in Furman v. Georgia,33 the primacy of
retribution had not seriously been disputed.34 Only two years later,
question" of the effectiveness of deterrence to the states). The dearth of statistical
deterrence proof is discussed infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REv.
1623, 1626 (1992). The purported theoretical flaws with retributivism are as follows:
"(1) That punishment is what criminal offenders deserve suffices to morally justify the
practice of punishing them. (2) The deterrence theory, but not retributivism, involves
improperly 'using' persons. (3) Retributivism accords the proper respect to the
personhood of criminals who are punished." Id. Professor Dolinko's sweeping criticism
of the underlying philosophical and moral foundation of retributive justice is fairly
typical of retribution detractors.
27. See, e.g., David J. Karp, Causation in the Model Penal Code, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
1249, 1257-58 (positing that retribution focuses on the culpability of the offender, while
retaliation focuses on the quantum of harm).
28. See Paul Butler, Retribution, for Liberals, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1873, 1879 (1999).
29. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
30. ld. at 71.
31. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 30445 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); id. at 342-44 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241, 248 (1949) ("Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal
law.").
32. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) ("A sentence can have a variety
of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.").
Incapacitation does not often stand on its own as a justification for punishment and
usually applies only to a limited class of punishments, most notably incarceration and
execution.
33. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
34. See id. at 342-45 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("The history of the Eighth
Amendment supports only the conclusion that retribution for its own sake is improper.").
Justice Brennan also distanced himself from the retributive justification for the death
penalty, writing that "[w]hen the overwhelming number of criminals who commit capital
[Vol. 119:4
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another concurring opinion seemed to indicate that retribution, however
unseemly to some members of the Court, was still a constitutionally valid
rationale for punishment, specifically the death penalty.35
Retribution and deterrence are both touted by the Court as
justifications for the death penalty when faced with Eighth Amendment
challenges to execution.36 Deterrence, although much maligned given
the lack of verifiable evidence of the rational murderer, is nearly always
listed alongside retribution.37 Clearly rehabilitation, at least in the non-
religious sense, cannot be achieved through the execution of the
condemned. In much of the Court's death penalty jurisprudence, the
Court takes great pains to recognize the legitimacy of retribution as a
reasonable, if problematic, foundation for the continued existence of the
death penalty.
The quintessential authority on the relationship between retribution
and the death penalty can be found in Gregg v. Georgia,38 the landmark
U.S. Supreme Court case reversing the effective ban on the death
penalty. In Gregg, Justice Stewart, drawing on his Furman opinion,
noted that:
Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law,.
. but neither is it a forbidden objective nor one inconsistent with our
respect for the dignity of men .... Indeed, the decision that capital
punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an
expression of the community's belief that certain crimes are
themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate
response may be the penalty of death.39
This concurring opinion represents the essential dynamic between
retributivist justice and the death penalty, as well as the Court's
affirmation of the death penalty as retribution exacted by the people.
crimes go to prison, it cannot be concluded that death serves the purpose of retribution
more effectively than imprisonment." Id. at 304 (Brennan, J., concurring).
35. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
36. See id. at 183.
37. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25. Numerous studies have attempted to establish the
deterrent effect of the death penalty. Thus far, none have convinced the Court that there
is a verifiable deterrent effect. For a recitation of some of the studies and debate
surrounding deterrence and the death penalty, see-Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185 n.31. More
recent studies were evaluated by Professors John Donohue and Justin Wolfers. John J.
Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty
Debate, 58 STAN. L. REv. 791, 843 (2005). The professors concluded, again, that "U.S.
data simply do not speak clearly about whether the death penalty has a deterrent or
antideterrent effect" and that relying on such data to support either the retention or the
abolition of the death penalty constituted potentially dangerous policy. Id. at 843, 845.
38. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
39. Id. at 183-84 (citations omitted).
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Although retribution forms a constitutional basis for capital
punishment, retribution does not stand as an unlimited power afforded to
the state to mete out punishment.4' Rather, retribution is constrained by
commonsensical interpretations of the Eighth Amendment. It might also
be said that retribution is, in and of itself, a limit on punishment.4'
However, the death penalty is not proportional as applied to certain,
limited classes of offenders, due to a lack of requisite culpability.42
The U.S. Supreme Court has limited the death penalty in two lines
of cases that are relevant to the issue of culpability, and therefore, to
retributivism. The first line of cases involves categorical bars to capital
punishment based on a characteristic or trait of the criminal defendant.
This line of cases is typified by Atkins v. Virginia,43 which barred the
imposition of capital punishment on mentally retarded offenders.44 In
addition, the execution of juveniles is unconstitutional according to
Roper v. Simmons.45 One might quibble with the reasoning of Roper, but
most retributivists would agree that the average juvenile lacks the moral
culpability to deserve the highest penalty authorized by law.46 The Court
held that "[r]etribution is not proportional if the law's most severe
penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is
diminished.., by reason of youth and immaturity. 4 7 In both the case of
40. Retribution, as opposed to revenge, is an orchestrated, methodical, and societal
approach to punishment. It is important to note that retribution, as a theory, does not
encourage or require the infliction of pain on a convicted criminal. See Markel, supra
note 12, at 438, 475-77. Vengeance (or revenge) and retribution are all too often
conflated. They are separable concepts-distinguished by how they are carried out and
why. See Andrew Oldenquist, Retribution and the Death Penalty, 29 U. DAYTON L. REv.
335, 340 (2004). The difference between vengeance and retribution often arises when the
effect on the victim becomes part of the punishment rationale. See Moore, Victims and
Retribution, supra note 24, at 75-76; see also Katie Long, Community Input at
Sentencing: Victim's Right or Victim's Revenge?, 75 B.U. L. REv. 187, 228 (1995).
41. See Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91
VA. L. REV. 677, 683 (2005). Professor Lee argues that retributivism should be
considered a "side constraint" on the Eighth Amendment. Id. As a side constraint,
Professor Lee argues, "retributivism does not require that we punish the guilty; it simply
states that multiple purposes of punishment may be pursued so long as no sentence that is
undeservedly harsh is imposed." Id. at 708; see also HART, supra note 24, at 236-37.
42. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (reasoning that juvenile
criminals lack full culpability for their actions); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319
(2002) (reasoning that mentally handicapped criminals lack full culpability for their
actions).
43. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
44. Id. at 321. The author is aware that there are more delicate, precise, and
politically correct terms for mental disabilities once commonly referred to as retardation.
For the sake of clarity and consistency, the term mentally retarded is used in this Article
only to mirror the words of the Supreme Court in Atkins.
45. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).
46. Id. at 570-71.
47. Id. at 571.
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mentally retarded and juvenile offenders, the right of retribution is
limited by culpability and therefore by a retributivist interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment.48
Finally, retribution played a central role in vacating the death
sentence in Pannetti v. Quarterman.49 In Panetti, the Court considered
whether a defendant once deemed competent despite mental illness but
who makes a "substantial showing" of incompetence post-trial could still
be put to death.0 The decisive answer was a resounding "no," based
partly on the lack of retributive value in such an execution:
The potential for a prisoner's recognition of the severity of the
offense and the objective of community vindication are called in
question, however, if the prisoner's mental state is so distorted by a
mental illness that his awareness of the crime and punishment has
little or no relation to the understanding of those concepts shared by
the community as a whole.5'
The challenge was a habeas petition to review constitutionally deficient
proceedings used to determine competency to stand trial.52 The Panetti
decision followed the decision in Ford v. Wainwright,3 which added the
insane to the list of those who cannot be sentenced to death.54 As Justice
Kennedy aptly pointed out in the Pannetti decision, the Ford court was
likewise concerned that the executing the insane would serve no valid
retributive purpose, notwithstanding the complete lack of legal precedent
for executing insane persons.55 Noticeably absent from the discussion in
Panetti is any mention of deterrent value, or its application to the case at
bar.
A second line of cases limiting the use of the death penalty deals not
with the offender, but the offense itself. In Coker v. Georgia,6 the
Supreme Court ruled that rape did not warrant the death penalty.5 7 The
Court controversially found that "in terms of moral depravity and of the
injury to the person and to the public," rape "does not compare with
48. There are few other specific instances in which the Supreme Court has
categorically banned executions as a matter of course as applied to particular offenders.
However, the Supreme Court has banned the execution of the insane. Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986).
49. Pannetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007).
50. Id. at 935.
51. ld. at 958-59.
52. Id. at 935.
53. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
54. Id. at 401.
55. Pannetti, 551 U.S. at 958 (citing Ford, 477 U.S. at 408).
56. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584.
57. Id. at 592.
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murder.,58 Executing a rapist was deemed "a disproportionate penalty"
limited by society's ability to seek retribution only from those who also
take a life.59 Likewise, in Kennedy v. Louisiana,6 ° the Court ruled that
execution for the rape of a child was a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.61 The Court reiterated the Coker holding and determined
that non-homicide crimes simply could not be compared to the "'severity
and irrevocability' of murder.62 One of the unmistakable rationales
behind the decision was a distinction between the retributive value of
execution for a "particularly depraved murder" and the value of
execution for "the crime of child rape.63
The Court also found the retributivist purpose of execution lacking
in Enmund v. Florida,64 in which the Court considered a capital
punishment sentence for felony-murder.65 The petitioner in Enmund was
the getaway driver in an armed robbery which resulted in the deaths of
two victims.6 6 In overturning the petitioner's death sentence, Justice
White wrote that condemning the petitioner to "death to avenge two
killings that he did not commit and had no intention of committing or
causing does not measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring
that the criminal gets his just deserts.,67 In the absence of proof of
intent, Enmund's death penalty sentence could not withstand a
retributivist analysis, much like in Coker and Kennedy.
The decisions in Coker, Kennedy, and Enmund find their primary
rationale in retributive theory, but the questionable deterrent value of the
respective capital sentences also played an important role.68 In addition
58. Id. at 598. The decision was controversial not so much in the holding as in the
callousness with which Justice White discussed rape. Justice White went on to compare
the murder victim and the rape victim, writing that "for the rape victim, life may not be
nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair." Id. in
Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court wisely distanced itself from the ill-advised
words of Justice White. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 435 (2008).
59. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597, 600.
60. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
61. ld. at 446-47.
62. Id. at 438 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 598).
63. Id. at 442.
64. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
65. Id. at 787.
66. Id. at 784-85.
67. Id. at 801.
68. See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 445. The Court reasoned:
The experience of the amici who work with child victims indicates that, when
the punishment is death, both the victim and the victim's family members may
be more likely to shield the perpetrator from discovery, thus increasing
underreporting. As a result, punishment by death may not result in more
deterrence or more effective enforcement.
Id. (internal citations omitted); Enmund 458 U.S. at 798-800 ("We are quite
unconvinced, however, that the threat that the death penalty will be imposed for murder
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to the case law pointing to retributive justification for the imposition of
capital punishment, the available empirical evidence clearly
demonstrates that other proffered justifications, particularly deterrence,
have dubious statistical support. A recent study conducted by the
National Academy of Sciences found no evidence that capital
punishment affected homicide rates at all. 69 This is not to say that the
study found no deterrent effect or that the death penalty does not deter-
in fact, the authors are quick to point out that potential fallacy-but
rather that the study found no reliable evidence indicating that the death
penalty affected homicide rates in any way, challenging studies that
claim otherwise.7 ° The essential conclusion was that studies claiming to
find potential deterrent effects should not affect the debate about the
continued use of the death penalty, due to a severe dearth of applicable
data.71
The available evidence points to a categorical conclusion:
retribution is the primary justification for the death penalty. As a theory
of punishment justifying the death penalty, however, retribution is not
without limits. This proposition flows from the very theoretical
underpinning of retributivism: moral culpability. The Supreme Court's
ruminations on lessened culpability and its effect on the retributive value
of the death penalty are further evidence of the inescapable nexus
between capital punishment and retributive justice. Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence demonstrates a concerted effort by the Supreme Court to
limit the imposition of capital punishment to highly culpable offenders.7
will measurably deter one who does not kill and has no intention or purpose that life will
be taken."). Although the Coker plurality did not expressly rely on the lack of deterrent
effect in executing a rapist, Chief Justice Burger's dissent noted the essential problem:
"[i]t is arguable that many prospective rapists would be deterred by the possibility that
they could suffer death for their offense; it is also arguable that the death penalty would
have only minimal deterrent effect." Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 617 (1977)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Court in Kennedy even wondered if the threat of the death
penalty for rape might make the attacker more likely to kill the victim. See Kennedy, 554
U.S. at 445-46.
69. NAT'L REs. COUNCIL ET AL., DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 2 (Daniel S.
Nagin & John V. Pepper eds., 2012).
70. Id. at 3 ("Judgment about whether there is a deterrent effect is still relevant to
policy, but that judgment should not be justified based on evidence from existing research
on capital punishment's effect on homicide.").
71. Id.
72. This point is further reinforced by those cases concerning mitigating factors in
the death penalty selection phase. Mitigating factors serve to limit the imposition of
capital punishment to "the worst of the worst." See Penry v. Lynbaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
319 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The Court reasoned:
[Plunishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the
criminal defendant. If the sentencer is to make an individualized assessment of
the appropriateness of the death penalty, "evidence about the defendant's
background and character is relevant because . . . defendants who commit
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Recent studies, finding evidence of deterrence lacking, bolster the case
law reinforcing the retributive purpose of the death penalty. As will be
explained in further detail, however, inordinate limitations on pain in
execution have the effect of undermining retribution as a justification for
the death penalty.
B. Death Penalty Abolition
In order to understand the lethal injection consensus and its
problematic underpinning, a brief history of the death penalty abolition
movement is necessary.73 The theoretical basis for death penalty
abolition is fairly straightforward, but the abolition movement's strategy
shift in the twentieth century helps to explain the topic of this Article.
As the abolitionist movement has shifted focus to the Eighth
Amendment, the winding course of litigation has worked to delay or
eliminate the use of the death penalty in many jurisdictions.
Increasingly, the abolitionist movement's efforts have worked to point
out flaws in the jurisprudence surrounding the death penalty-largely a
creation of the same movement.
1. Origins of the Abolitionist Cause
The American death penalty abolitionist movement spans the
history of our young nation and is well documented. Early efforts
focused on legislative reform. During the twentieth century, abolitionists
found their greatest ally: the Supreme Court. The movement took aim at
criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to
emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who
have no such excuse."
Id. (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring));
see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978). In Lockett, the Court reasoned:
[A] statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving
indepefident mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character and
record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the
risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for
a less severe penalty.
Id.
73. This Article necessarily assumes that retributivism and death penalty abolition
are generally opposed theories. That underlying proposition, however, only functions as
a generality. On their face, the two concepts are not necessarily opposed; for instance, a
retributivist could reasonably believe that the death penalty is not proportional to the
crime of murder, or that problems with the procedure in capital cases could lead to the
execution of innocent persons. There exists a movement among retributivists, although a
distinctly minority position, that the death penalty should be abolished for any number of
reasons including the impossibility of determining guilt to a necessary degree to inflict
the punishment and a lack of proportionality. For a discussion of the retributivist
abolitionist's position, see generally, for example, Markel, supra note 12.
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the judicial branch and although it experienced success, failed to end the
death penalty altogether.
During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, death penalty
abolition followed other popular reform movements including
temperance, prison reform, and women's suffrage.74 The slavery debate,
and eventually the Civil War, impeded progress on ending the death
penalty, but not before several states banned capital punishment.75 The
so-called Progressive Era during the turn of the century similarly did not
bring much in the way of abolitionist movement.
The 1930s and 40s saw the number of executions skyrocket and
paved the way for a new abolitionist tactic.76 Rather than focus on
legislative change, reformers in the 1950s and 1960s focused on the
courts. Specifically, the NAACP's Legal Education and Defense Fund
spearheaded efforts to mount a constitutional attack on the death
penalty.77 This shift in strategy was effective in essentially grinding
capital punishment to a halt in the 1960s and in nearly ending the
punishment altogether in Furman. The abolitionist challenge to the
constitutionality of the death penalty under an Eighth Amendment
analysis by way of the Fourteenth Amendment led the Supreme Court to
apply an increasingly more demanding standard to capital punishment
methods. The jurisprudence on the death penalty after Furman created
paradoxical justifications and limits on the death penalty.
2. Paradox as Support for Abolition
The legal challenges of the 1960s and 70s erected numerous barriers
to the imposition of the death penalty that have changed the very legal
foundation of capital punishment. Since those challenges, the
abolitionist movement has drawn attention to the numerous
inconsistencies in capital punishment jurisprudence, such as the seeming
irony in holding that the Eighth Amendment bars the use of excessive
force against inmates in prison while also allowing for capital
punishment.78  Another rhetorically alarming paradox was raised by
Justice Stevens in Baze v. Rees: although most states use pancromium
bromide (a paralytic agent) in lethal injection and its use has been
74. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty
Moratorium Movement in the United States, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 7 (2002).
75. Id. at 8.
76. Id. at 11.
77. Id. at 13.
78. Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 IOWA
L. REV. 319, 399 (1997).
2015]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
deemed constitutional, several states have outlawed the drug's use in
animal euthanasia.79
The death penalty abolitionist movement has become a powerful
and influential voice for changing our nation's policy on the death
penalty. Increasingly, through legal challenges and academic fora,
abolitionists have brilliantly turned Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
into both a tool and a weapon to eliminate the death penalty. As a tool,
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is a vehicle to delay and overturn
death sentences. As a weapon, the manifest paradoxes in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence are attacked and displayed as evidence of the
irony, hypocrisy, and arbitrariness in imposing the death penalty.s
In order to counter the intellectual argument for banning the
imposition of the death penalty, those who support the death penalty and
those who believe that the imperative lies with legislatures to determine
capital punishment's usefulness must advocate for the elimination of the
paradoxes at the heart of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. As will be
detailed below, the evolving standard of decency test has led to a
confusing line of cases purporting to detail the constitutionality of
particular punishments. Abolitionists, to their credit, have both
supported continued efforts to confuse the definition of "cruel and
unusual" and simultaneously decried its innumerable complexities and
inconsistencies.81
C. Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence: Evolving Standards of Decency
Beginning in the 1950s, the Supreme Court began exploring the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment in earnest. Detailing the Supreme
Court's confusing and fluid interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's
ban on cruel and unusual punishment will reveal the foundation of the
79. "It is unseemly-to say the least-that Kentucky may well kill petitioners using
a drug that it would not permit to be used on their pets." Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 72-
73 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
80. Professor Deborah Denno, for her part, is a master of using Eighth Amendment
paradox to point out serious flaws in capital punishment. See, e.g., Denno, supra note 78,
at 399 ("[I]f the Court encouraged judicial scrutiny of execution methods to the same
extent that it has evaluated prison conditions, it might reach the conclusion that no
execution method that currently exists could be implemented humanely."); Denno, supra
note 11, at 65 ("Oftentimes, friends and foes of the death penalty align both sides of the
execution methods debate, despite their different goals. The result is a dangerous and
distorted legal 'philosophy' of punishment that erodes human rights and constitutional
safeguards, most particularly the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause.").
81. See, e.g., Baze, 553 U.S. at 104-05 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that
currently, the "best option for those seeking to abolish the death penalty is to embroil the
States in never-ending litigation concerning the adequacy of their execution procedures").
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paradoxical lethal injection alliance between death penalty detractors and
supporters. In 1958 the Supreme Court introduced a new theme to
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence: the dignity of man. Since Trop v.
Dulles, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has taken confusing and
seemingly disparate turns to conform to an evolving standard of decency.
Adding to the Eighth Amendment milieu are the Eighth Amendment
cases regarding methods of execution. The application of the Eighth
Amendment to methods of execution, when combined with the Court's
focus on the evolving standard of decency, sets the stage for the conflict
between retribution and humaneness.
1. The Dignity of Man and Evolving Standard of Decency
The evolving standard of decency test originated in Trop v. Dulles,
a 1958 case in which the Supreme Court considered whether punishing a
citizen with a loss of citizenship violated the Constitution's protections
against cruel and unusual punishment.82 The evolving standard of
decency and the dignity of man are now mainstays of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. Although Trop v. Dulles was a unique case
decided by a plurality of the Court and involved a military crime, a
specific statutory scheme, and a particularly unusual punishment,83 the
standards embodied in Trop have since been applied to constitutional
death penalty challenges.84
The facts of the case involved a former American soldier who had
been punished for desertion during the Second World War."5 After his
dishonorable discharge, Albert Trop attempted to apply for a passport.86
His application was denied based on his dishonorable discharge.87 In
fact, Mr. Trop's discharge resulted in a loss of citizenship under the
Nationality Act of 1940.88 The Supreme Court, in a split decision, found
that the denationalization punishment violated the Eighth Amendment.89
According to the Court, the "basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man."90 In deciding the
case, the Court aptly noted the relative lack of jurisprudential precedent
82. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958).
83. Id. at 87-91.
84. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
269-70 (1972) (Brennan, J. concurring).
85. Trop, 356 U.S. at 88. Trop deserted his post in French Morocco in May, 1944.
Id. at 87. Trop was "gone less than a day" and "willingly surrendered to an officer on an
Army vehicle while he was walking back towards his base." Id
86. Id. at 88.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 88-89.
89. Id. at 103-04.
90. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
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on the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.91 The Court cited to Weems
v. United States,92 however, to support the proposition that the Eighth
Amendment was not "precise" and that the scope of the Amendment was
not static.93 Finally, in defining its interpretive methodology, Chief
Justice Warren wrote that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society.
94
In applying this interpretive methodology, the Court found the use
of denationalization cruel and unusual.95 The Court suggested little in
the way of testing the evolving standard of decency-but did cite the
"virtual unanimity" of the "civilized nations of the world" against
statelessness as an appropriate punishment.96 In addition, the Court
noted that the punishment had never been recognized in the United States
before 1940. 97 In its extreme unusualness, denationalization simply
could not withstand the Eighth Amendment challenge.98 The Supreme
Court left open the question of defining more specifically the "evolving
standard of decency." The meaning of those phrases quickly became
evident in the death penalty context.
2. The Evolving Standard in the Courts Since Trop v. Dulles
Although Trop v. Dulles was not a death penalty case, the evolving
standard of decency test has been applied to numerous death penalty
challenges. The application of the evolving standard of decency to the
death penalty, likely intended to standardize the constitutionality of the
death penalty, has only served to confuse Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. Specifically, two cases applying the evolving standard of
decency test underscore the problematic aspects of the test: Furman v.
Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia.
Furman and Gregg, cases decided less than five years apart, have
come to represent the modem incarnation of the evolving standard of
decency test. In Furman, the Court's plurality opinion declared the death
penalty unconstitutional and sowed the seeds of what would become the
evolving standard of decency test. Justice Marshall's opinion, in
particular, laid much of the foundation for what would become the
standard formula. Justice Marshall looked to the other concurring
91. Id.
92. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
93. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01.
94. Id. at 101.
95. Id. at 99-102.
96. Id. at 102.
97. Id. at 100 n.32.
98. Trop, 356 U.S. at 103-04.
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decisions and distilled four primary principles: (1) that "there are certain
punishments that inherently involve so much physical pain and suffering
that civilized people cannot toleration them," such as the rack and the
thumbscrew; (2) that "there are punishments that are unusual, signifying
that they were previously unknown as penalties for a given offense" and
if intended to "serve a humane purpose" may be constitutional; (3) that
"a penalty may be cruel and unusual because it is excessive and serves
no valid legislative purpose" and (4) that "where a punishment is not
excessive and serves a valid purpose, it still may be invalid if popular
sentiment abhors it." 99 Finding that the death penalty was excessive and
unnecessary, and that the penalty was abhorrent to the public, Justice
Marshall voted with the plurality.100
In 1976, the Supreme Court heard Gregg v. Georgia and effectively
reversed the death penalty moratorium imposed by Furman. Justice
Stewart further refined the evolving standard of decency test. Justice
Stewart's evolving standard of decency test, while drawing from the four
factors enumerated by Justice Marshall in Furman, set out a two-part
inquiry: an assessment of contemporary values followed by an analysis
of whether the penalty comports with the dignity of man. Contemporary
values are gauged by "objective indicia" of public opinion.101 Whether
the punishment comports with the dignity of man is primarily a legal
question, which requires the Court to consider whether the punishment is
excessive. 102 Finding that a "large proportion of American society
continues to regard [the death penalty] as an appropriate and necessary
criminal sanction," the Court moved to the second part of the test. 1 03 In
determining whether the punishment in question is excessive, and
therefore whether it comports with the dignity of man, Justice Stewart
concluded that the punishment "must not involve the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain" and must be "proportion[al] to the severity of
the crime.' 1 4 The Court further held that a punishment must not be "so
totally without penalogical justification that it results in gratuitous
infliction of suffering."'0 5  Determining that the death penalty could
arguably serve deterrent and retributive purposes, and that the
99. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 330-33 (1972) (Marhsall, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 358-60, 371. Justice Marshall's finding, particularly that public sentiment
abhorred the death penalty, is subject to scrutiny. Given the Court's complete 1800 in
Gregg, one can hardly imagine that public opinion in 1972 abhorred the death penalty,
but public sentiment in 1976 supported capital punishment. Compare Furman, 408 U.S.
at 368, with Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175-76, 179-80 (1976).
101. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 179-82.
104. Id. at 173.
105. Id. at 183.
2015]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
punishment was proportional, the Supreme Court held that the death
penalty was once again a constitutional form of punishment. 
106
Furman and Gregg sum up the Supreme Court's evolving standard
of decency test post-Trop. In particular, the dignity of man element-
what has interestingly been deemed "the exercise of [the Court's]
independent judgment"10 7 or bringing the Court's judgment to bear-
plays a leading role in considering the constitutionality of methods of
execution in later cases. The evolving standard of decency, and
particularly the Court's judgment as to the death penalty's basis in
penalogical theory and proportionality, has created an untenable conflict
in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
3. The Eighth Amendment and Methods of Execution
By the time the Supreme Court decided Furman and Gregg, Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence was applicable not only to the
constitutionality of the death penalty itself, but also to particular methods
of execution. The short history of method-of-execution challenges
represents a traditionally retributivist rationale for the death penalty and
the relative lack of success petitioners had in challenging methods of
execution. The holdings in Furman and Gregg, which espoused concern
over the dignity of man, once again made it possible to successfully
challenge a method of execution.
The first method-of-execution challenge to come before the court
was Wilkerson v. Utah.108 In Wilkerson, the Supreme Court held that
Utah's use of the firing squad to execute inmates was constitutional.0 9
The Court flatly ruled that cruel and unusual punishments are "forbidden
by the Constitution, but . . . the punishment of shooting as a mode of
executing the death penalty for the crime of murder in the first degree is
not included in that category."110
In re Kemmler,11 12 years later, similarly rejected a claim that the
electric chair was cruel and unusual punishment.12 The Supreme Court
attempted to put its stamp on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence by
defining the very meaning of the Eighth Amendment: "Punishments are
cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment
of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous,
106. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186-87, 206-07.
107. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
108. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
109. Id. at 134-35.
110. Id.
111. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
112. Id. at 447.
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something more than the mere extinguishment of life." '113 Finding that
electrocution did not meet the definition of torture, or the types of
punishment outlined as cruel in Wilkerson, the Court upheld New York's
electrocution statute. 114
The Court rejected another method-of-execution challenge in 1947
with Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber.115 In Resweber, the State of
Louisiana previously made an unsuccessful attempt to electrocute the
convict.1 6 The convict then challenged the electrocution procedure,
claiming that a second attempt after a first failed attempt would
constitute cruel and unusual punishment."7 The "cruelty against which
the Constitution protects," wrote the plurality, "is cruelty inherent in the
method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any
method employed [by the state] to extinguish life humanely."'11 Calling
the abortive electrocution attempt "an unforeseeable accident" and
finding no intent on the part of the State to subject the petitioner to
cruelty, the Court ruled that Louisiana's second attempt to execute the
petitioner could proceed.119
Not until 2008 would another method-of-execution challenge come
before the Supreme Court. More than a half-century after its last
method-of-execution challenge, the Court would have a vast array of
new Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to consider, applying standards as
yet unheard of in method-of-execution challenges. The confluence of the
Court's experience with method-of-execution challenges and the
evolving standard of decency test paved the way for a collision between
retribution and humaneness. Retribution, one of few remaining
justifications for the death penalty, does not comport with the "dignity of
man" as it has evolved over the last half century.
II. RETRIBUTION AND HUMANENESS: INCOMPATIBLE ALLIES
After the establishment of the evolving standard of decency test,
which inherently causes conflict between retributive justice and
humaneness, an alliance between lethal injection supporters and
detractors became possible and arguably necessary. The alliance is a
result of sheer necessity and perceived constitutionality. However, the
truce reveals some of the numerous problems with Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. The paradoxical lethal injection truce is emblematic of
113. Id.
114. Id. at 445-47.
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the larger conflict between retribution and humaneness in methods of
execution-a conflict that has played out largely in state courts of last
resort. Perhaps the most apposite example of this tension, however, was
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Baze v. Rees.1
20
A. Retribution Versus Humaneness
The evolving standard of decency test, as applied to the Eighth
Amendment method-of-execution challenges, creates conflict between
retribution and humaneness-conflict that has led to support for lethal
injection from both death penalty supporters and abolitionists. The result
of the paradox of lethal injection support, and more importantly of the
inherent tension in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, is that courts are
increasingly skeptical of capital punishment in conformity with the
evolving standard of decency.
1. The Alliance: Support for Lethal Injection
Professor Deborah Denno, a notable abolitionist and prolific writer
on death penalty jurisprudence, was one of the first scholars to recognize
the absurdity of the lethal injection consensus. The consensus is evident
in legislative battles over method of execution. The consensus is not in
and of itself the problem; rather, the truce over lethal injection represents
the ultimate conflict created by Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
a. Professor Denno's Curious Observation
Given the diametrically opposed goals of retributivist death penalty
supporters and death penalty abolitionists, common ground between the
two groups is virtually nonexistent. One significant exception to the
general rule pervades the death penalty debate: lethal injection.
Professor Deborah W. Denno has noted as much in her campaign to end
the death penalty:
Generally, pro and con debates concerning the death penalty are
divisively clear. Such predictability is not the hallmark of reactions
to changes in execution methods, however. Oftentimes, friends and
foes of the death penalty align both sides of the execution methods
debate, despite their different goals. 
121
Professor Denno goes on to call attention to the "core of th[e] execution
methods paradox": whether states will "reject or retain the death penalty
120. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008).
121. Denno, supra note 11, at 65.
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and which stance will ensure their success.'' 122 While Professor Denno is
correct to note the paradox, and likely part of the reasoning behind the
paradox, one must question the source of the rationale. Indeed, the
abiding reason that death penalty supporters are forced to advocate for
lethal injection is that the trend in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
dictates seemingly more humane methods of carrying out the death
penalty. Likewise, whether states (especially those in which support for
the death penalty remains high) will choose to alter their method of
execution or ban it altogether is largely dictated by the perceived
constitutionality of the method, by Professor Denno's own admission.
123
In any case, Professor Denno makes one final point about the paradox
that bears repeating:
Paradoxically, the two sides also have united by promoting lethal
injection because it appears more humane. For this reason, some
proponents feel that injection can save the death penalty from
abolition while some opponents believe injection can save inmates
from torture. Public opinion polls occupy both camps: the public
says it wants the death penalty, but it also wants what it believes to be
the most humane method of execution. 
124
The source of this strange truce over humaneness is not necessarily
the result of legal actors deciding whether opposition or support for the
death penalty is most politically advantageous. This viewpoint has the
benefit of blaming death penalty supporters and simultaneously
weakening the theoretical underpinnings of the death penalty, but it does
not do the issue justice. The paradox is the direct result of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence which mandates consideration of pain as a
result of evolving standards of decency in addition to the ever-expanding
procedural hurdles already impeding the imposition of lawful sentences.
b. Evidence of the Truce: Lethal Injection Advocates
Professor Denno utilizes a number of media sources to support her
paradox theory.'25 More specifically, she points to the example of an
Ohio legislative session in which two death penalty supporters lined up
on different sides of the debate over the continued use of the electric
chair in that state.126  One legislator reportedly advocated for the
continued use of the electric chair as an expression of the people's
retributivist sentiment, while the other claimed that its use would hasten
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 65-66 (citations omitted).
125. See generally id.
126. Denno, supra note 11, at 89-90.
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the end of the death penalty in Ohio.'2 7 The same was true for death
penalty abolitionists: some wanted the electric chair to remain to
highlight the perceived barbarity of executions, while others wanted to
eliminate its use because the electric chair was considered torturous. 
1 28
As for lethal injection, support for Denno's curious observation can
also be found in reporting on the death penalty. State legislators have
plainly admitted that their support for lethal injection is an attempt to
"save" the death penalty from constitutional attack. 129 Abolitionists are
clearly troubled with the thought of legitimating the death penalty, but at
least some abolition proponents would prefer some "reform" in capital
punishment to none.!3° Perhaps the move toward more "humane"
methods of punishment can be included in the incremental capital
punishment reform movement. In any case, the most obvious example of
the desperation felt by capital punishment supporters is the case of
Florida's capital punishment system. Florida's legislature abruptly
adopted lethal injection in 2000.131 The sudden shift occurred after one
of the legion Florida cases affirming execution by electrocution was
granted certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.132 To avoid the inevitable
result based on the evolving standard of decency test, the Florida
legislature opted to follow the trend in favor of lethal injection.
The paradoxical support for lethal injection is representative of a
larger problem. That both sides agree on lethal injection means that both
can find value in the use of lethal injection. For retributivists, that means
constitutionality. For abolitionists, it means "humaneness" and perhaps
another step toward the end of the death penalty. For the Eighth
Amendment and capital punishment, the truce means trouble.
127. Id. at 90.
128. Id
129. In the article cited by Professor Denno, supra note 11, at 66 n. 11, Alabama State
Senator Hinton Mitchem reportedly feared that electrocution would be deemed
unconstitutional. David Crary, Electric Chair's Days Are Numbered as Cruelty is Cited,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2001, at A. 18, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/aug/19/news/mn-35783. That concern led the Senator to
propose lethal injection as an option in his state. Id. Alabama passed legislation
changing its method of execution to lethal injection in 2002. See Act of Apr. 25, 2002,
ch. 2002-492, 2002, § 1, Ala. Acts 1243, 1244 (codified at Ala. Code § 15-18-82.1 (West,
Westlaw through Act 2015-16 of 2015 Reg. Sess.)).
130. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support
Legislative "Reform" of the Death Penalty?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 417, 418 (2002).
131. See Act of Jan. 14, 2000, ch. 2000-2, sec. 1, § 922.10, 2000 Fla. Laws 2, 2
(codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 922.105 (2014)).
132. See Deborah W. Denno, Adieu to Electrocution, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 665, 665
(2000). The case was dismissed because Florida changed its method of execution before
the case was heard. Bryan v. Moore, 528 U.S. 1133, 1133 (2000); Denno, supra, at 665.
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2. The Result of the Paradox - The Undoing of the Death Penalty
Most of the litigation invoking the evolving standard of decency has
been argued in state courts of last resort. The Supreme Court's reliance
on the evolving standard of decency has led to a truce between death
penalty advocates and abolitionists in favor of lethal injection. But that
alliance is emblematic of a conflict between retribution as a
constitutionally permissible goal in carrying out the death penalty and the
simultaneous constitutional mandate that the death penalty be as painless
as possible. The result of this curious paradox is an abolitionist's dream:
court decisions decrying the death penalty as cruel and unusual. If this
was not the aim of the Supreme Court, it is the result. Several recent
cases are representative of the path of death penalty litigation in its
current constitutional framework.
a. The States' Experience with Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
In State v. Mata,33 the evolving standard of decency test almost put
an end to the death penalty in Nebraska.134 Because Nebraska did not
maintain an alternate method of execution, the judgment of the Nebraska
Supreme Court effectively banned the use of capital punishment, until
the Nebraska legislature passed a bill authorizing lethal injection. 135 In
finding that electrocution violated Nebraska's equivalent of the Eighth
Amendment,136 the Nebraska Supreme Court adopted an unnecessary
risk of harm test.137  Specifically, the court held that a method of
execution is cruel and unusual if there exists a "substantial foreseeable
risk, inherent in the method, that a prisoner will suffer unnecessary
133. State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229 (Neb. 2008).
134. Id. at 279-80.
135. Act of May. 28, 2009, ch. 36, sec. 9, § 29-2532, 2009 Neb. Laws 50, 52
(codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 83-964 (West, Westlaw though End of
2014 Reg. Sess.)).
136. The Nebraska Supreme Court took great pains to avoid Supreme Court eview,
specifically basing their decision on Article 1, Section 9 of the Nebraska Constitution
which reads, in part: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." NEB. CONST., art. I, § 9; Mata, 745 N.W.2d
at 261. Even though the decision in Mata was not expressly based on the Eighth
Amendment, that Nebraska's cruel and unusual punishment provision mirrors exactly the
federal Constitution partly helps to explain why the Mata court "look[ed] to federal
precedent for guidance regarding general standards to maintain harmony between parallel
constitutional provisions." Mata, 745 N.W.2d at 261.
137. This lower standard is different from the substantial risk of significant harm test
that was established in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994) and reaffirmed in
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008). Of course, the states are free to provide more
constitutional protection than the floor set by the Supreme Court. While the Supreme
Court distinguishes between the substantial risk test and the unnecessary risk test, the two
are eerily similar.
2015]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
pain." 38  The court in Mata found a number of deficiencies in
Nebraska's electrocution protocol: a risk of burning, a lack of sufficient
current to kill the inmate instantaneously, and the potential for
mutilation.139 The Nebraska Supreme Court was particularly concerned
with what it deemed the "purposeless infliction of physical violence and
mutilation of the prisoner's body" and that "more humane" methods of
execution could be used.
140
Unlike Mata, the Florida Supreme Court case Provenzano v.
Moore14 1 did not place a moratorium on the death penalty; however, the
dissent was so alarming and sensational that it helped effectively end the
use of the electric chair in Florida.142 By describing in graphic detail the
botched execution of Allen Lee Davis, Justice Shaw's dissent gained
national notoriety. Justice Shaw even appended photos to his decision to
emphasize his position. 143 Like the majority opinion in Mata, Justice
Shaw's dissent was primarily concerned with "smoke and flames and
blood and screams" accompanying botched electrocution attempts.
44
Although less concerned solely with the amount of pain, 145 the emphasis
on the potential for mutilation and discomfort on the part of the prisoner
is unmistakable. While the majority found electrocution did not violate
the Eighth Amendment,146 frequent challenges to the electric chair's
constitutionality eventually led Florida to switch its method of execution
to lethal injection.
147
b. Baze v. Rees: Setting the Paradoxical Standard for Future
Litigation
As opposed to challenges to the use of the electric chair, challenges
to the use of lethal injection have largely been unsuccessful. The
Supreme Court's most recent case on lethal injection, Baze v. Rees,
highlights the difficulty in challenging the protocol used in administering
lethal injection. 48 Jurisprudentially, the case is a nightmare for those
seeking any semblance of uniformity or a standard to apply in future
138. Mata, 745 N.W.2d at 261.
139. Id. at 277-79.
140. Id. at 278 (emphasis added).
141. Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1999).
142. Id. at 422-42 (1999) (Shaw, J. dissenting).
143. Id. at 442.
144. Id. at 440.
145. Id. at 428.
146. Provenzano, 744 So. 2d at 416.
147. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. Note that Florida changed its
preferred method of execution less than one year after Provenzano was decided.
148. See generally Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
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cases-or a solution to the Supreme Court's self-created crisis in
interpreting the Eighth Amendment.
Baze v. Rees is the most recent method-of-execution challenge
considered by the Supreme Court. The concurring opinion left many
commentators wondering what precedential value, if any, the Baze
decision has for future challenges.149  In any case, the Roberts
concurrence, which was joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, appears to
have commanded the most respect from Court watchers.150 The result of
Baze was yet another unsuccessful method-of-execution challenge, but a
glimmer of hope for abolitionists.
The facts of Baze centered on Kentucky's lethal injection
protocol.'51 The petitioner argued that the procedure utilized by the
Commonwealth created an "unnecessary risk of pain" that violated the
Eighth Amendment. Kentucky countered that the Eighth Amendment
requires only that the State's lethal injection protocol must not cause any
"substantial risk of serious harm."153  The holding of the case was
unmistakable: five Justices deemed the evidence insufficient to find
Kentucky's lethal injection protocol unconstitutional. 1
54
Justices Roberts, Kennedy, and Alito favored the substantial risk
test. 55 In the future, in order to succeed under the Baze test, petitioners
must demonstrate that a proposed alternative death penalty protocol is:
feasible, readily implemented, and [will] in fact significantly reduce a
substantial risk of severe pain. If a State refuses to adopt such an
alternative in the face of these documented advantages, without a
legitimate penological justification for adhering to its current method
of execution, then a State's refusal to change its method can be
viewed as "cruel and unusual" under the Eighth Amendment. 156
Justice Stevens did not adopt a test, but as detailed below, took the
opportunity to disparage the death penalty and simultaneously hold that
149. See generally Justin F. Marceau, Lifting the Haze of Baze: Lethal Injection, the
Eighth Amendment, and Plurality Opinions, 41 ARIz. ST. L.J. 159 (2009).
150. See Marceau, supra note 149, at 211-15. Professor Marceau delves into
different plurality opinion reading techniques, which result in different holdings and
questionable precedential value. Professor Marceau wrote that according to the so-called
predictive approach to the Marks rule, perhaps the most mainstream method of reading
the plurality opinion tea leaves, the concurring opinion of Justices Roberts, Kennedy, and
Alito carries the weight of the Baze holding. Id. at 215-17.
151. Baze, 553 U.S. at 45-46.
152. Id. at 47.
153. Id. at 48.
154. Id. at 63.
155. Id. at 47-48.
156. Baze, 553 U.S. at 52.
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the protocol used by Kentucky was constitutional, if abhorrent.157
Justices Scalia and Thomas each wrote an opinion in which the other
concurred, agreeing with the eventual result of the Roberts
concurrence.
158
Thus, five Justices agreed in the result, if not the test, in Baze. The
substantial risk of serious harm analysis is, despite Chief Justice Robert's
admonitions,'" a Pandora's Box. Justice Stevens aptly predicted that the
result of this test would be a quagmire in the lower courts.160 Numerous
questions remain open. How could states and petitioners determine if an
alternative method can be readily implemented? Likewise, how can a
state determine that a particular method of execution will reduce the
amount of pain experienced by convicts? States cannot simply alter their
execution methods to test their relative effectiveness. The results of the
Baze analysis are anything but uniform or clear. Petitioners may fail to
prove an Eighth Amendment violation due to a lack of feasible
alternatives. While the Roberts concurrence ostensibly requires a
"feasible, readily implemented" alternative to the challenged method of
execution,16 1  the sheer impracticality of proposing a viable
substitutionary method of capital punishment may force the Court to
apply the substantial risk test to a lethal injection protocol on its face. A
convicted murderer might then convince the Court that a particular lethal
injection protocol poses such a substantial risk of harm, that despite the
lack of an alternative procedure, the Court must enjoin the process from
continuing.'62 Another possibility is that states will now be effectively
forced to adopt the one-drug protocol advanced in Baze.163 Whatever the
case, Baze does little to solve the constitutional crisis in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.
157. Id. at 71, 87 (Stevens, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 107 (Thomas, J., and Scalia, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 61 (plurality opinion). Chief Justice Roberts admonishes:
Justice STEVENS suggests that our opinion leaves the disposition of other
cases uncertain, but the standard we set forth here resolves more challenges
than he acknowledges. A stay of execution may not be granted on grounds
such as those asserted here unless the condemned prisoner establishes that the
State's lethal injection protocol creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain. He
must show that the risk is substantial when compared to the known and
available alternatives. A State with a lethal injection protocol substantially
similar to the protocol we uphold today would not create a risk that meets this
standard.
Id. (citations omitted).
160. Id. at 71 (Stevens, J., concurring).
161. Baze, 553 U.S. at 52 (plurality opinion).
162. This eventuality is essentially the result of State v. Mata, the Nebraska case
described supra notes 133-40 and accompanying text.
163. Baze, 553 U.S. at 51.
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The constitutional quagmire will continue to present problems as
increasing pressure to alter methods of execution mounts. Until very
recently, the most widely-used lethal injection protocol included sodium
thiopental, an anesthetic.1 64 The European manufacturers of this drug
ceased production beginning in 2011.165 As such, states have
increasingly sought to utilize different drugs to carry out lawful
sentences. Ohio recently utilized a two-drug protocol to execute
convicted rapist and murderer Dennis McGuire.'66 Following reports of
his gasping and writhing in pain during his execution, Mr. McGuire's
family has promised to sue.167 While Mr. McGuire's execution is the
most recent example implicating the tension between retribution and the
evolving standard of decency, his will not be the last. Baze failed to
answer many questions-and therefore left the door open for yet another
round of death penalty litigation regarding new drug protocols.
Fortuitously, Professor Denno has already pounced on the perceived
deficiencies in Mr. McGuire's execution and called for a reconsideration
of the issues raised in Baze.' 68  The outcry about Mr. McGuire's
execution, in conjunction with the aforementioned shortage of lethal
injection drugs, also alarmed death penalty advocates. A number of state
senators, for instance, have proposed switching to alternate methods of
execution such as the firing squad.169 Utah's legislature recently passed a
bill allowing for execution by firing squad, which only awaits the
governor's approval.170  Ohio has officially ceased the use of the two-
drug protocol in favor of the three-drug protocol, despite the lack of
164. See Lacking Lethal Injection Drugs, supra note 8. Another drug commonly used
in lethal injection protocols, pentobarbital, is also in short supply and banned by the
European Union as an execution drug. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Erica Goode, After a Prolonged Execution, Questions Over 'Cruel and
Unusual', N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2014, at A12, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/18/us/prolonged-execution-prompts-debate-over-death-
penalty-methods.html?_r-O.
167. See Ohio Lawsuit To Ban Repeat of Lethal Injection, supra note 7.
168. Goode, supra note 166.
169. Id. ("In Wyoming, the shortage of lethal injection drugs has led State Senator
Bruce Bums, Republican of Sheridan County, to propose offering a firing squad as an
alternative method of execution."). Missouri lawmaker Rick Bratten also recently
proposed switching the state's primary method of execution to the firing squad. See H.R.
1470, 97th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2014); see also Reid Wilson, States Search
for Alternatives to Lethal Injection, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/01/30/states-search-for-
alternatives-to-lethal-injection/.
170. See Michelle L. Price, Utah Governor Says He'll Likely Approve Firing Squad
Bill, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/utah-
governor-says-hell-likely-approve-firing-squad-bill/2015/03/19/4a61 fl ba-ce5 c- 11 e4-
8730-4f473416e759_story.html.
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available sodium thiopental.171  Regardless of the merits of either
position, the furor surrounding Mr. McGuire's execution serves as
immutable evidence that the vagaries of Baze are the future of death
penalty litigation. In fact, members of the Court seemingly predicted
future challenges involving lethal injection protocols based on the
tension inherent in Baze between the evolving standard of decency and
retribution-the very same debate raging as a result of newly designed
lethal injection protocols.
Justice Stevens' concurrence in Baze is most emblematic of the
tension between retribution and humaneness. Justice Stevens highlights
the objective evidence of pain caused by the most common three-drug
cocktail used by states in lethal injection.172 Unlike Justice Roberts'
opinion, in which two other Justices agreed to a substantial risk of
significant harm test,173 Justice Stevens ominously and honestly wrote
that states wishing to preserve the death penalty "would do well to
reconsider their continued use of pancuronium bromide," one of the
drugs used in most lethal injection protocols. 1
74
Justice Stevens also criticized the rest of the Court for failing to test
the waters of the constitutionality of the death penalty as a whole.175 In
doing so, Justice Stevens pointed out a critical flaw in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence:
In an attempt to bring executions in line with our evolving standards
of decency, we have adopted increasingly less painful methods of
execution, and then declared previous methods barbaric and archaic.
But by requiring that an execution be relatively painless, we
necessarily protect the inmate from enduring any punishment that is
comparable to the suffering inflicted on his victim. This trend, while
appropriate and required by the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment, actually undermines the very premise
on which public approval of the retribution rationale is based. 1
76
Justice Stevens' rumination on the death penalty indicates his likely
support for death penalty abolition, a position he took publically after his
retirement.177 And although Justice Stevens seems to partially conflate
171. See Sarah Boehme, Former State Attorneys General Ask Supreme Court To Ban
Oklahoma Execution Drug Cocktail, JURIST (Mar. 18, 2015, 1:01 PM),
http:/!jurist.org/paperchase/2015/03/former-state-attorneys-general-ask-supreme-court-to-
ban-oklahoma-execution-drug-cocktail.php.
172. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 71-78 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 52 (plurality opinion).
174. Id. at 77 (Stevens, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 78 (Stevens, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 80-81 (citations omitted).
177. Mike Sacks, Justice John Paul Stevens Talks Death Penalty, Citizens United,
New Memoir, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2011, 9:52 AM),
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retribution with the infliction of pain, he does note that continual efforts
to make the death penalty more humane are incongruous with popular
notions of retribution.178 Justice Stevens, a death penalty opponent, has
discovered the abolitionist's dream: an untenable paradox. Retribution
and ever-increasing standards for limiting the pain of the condemned are
diametrically opposed concepts.
Even if pain is not part of the equation for retributivists, it is
problematic. Assuming that retribution remains one of the few
remaining rationales for the death penalty,179 it follows that we execute to
give the convicted what they deserve. Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
holds that we can punish the condemned with death-but only if that
death does not cause "unnecessary or wanton pain."'80 This concern, not
necessarily in line with retributivist theory, may be its demise with
regard to the death penalty. Retribution, although demanding
proportionality in punishment, does not require the infliction of pain
upon a condemned murderer-only the deserved punishment.'8 Thus,
many retributivists find capital punishment to be a proportional
punishment for murder, in order to respect the sanctity of life. While
some retributivists feel that capital punishment should be painful to
mirror the suffering of the victim, most retributivists only call for the
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/27/j ustice-john-paul-stevens-
memoir n 982386.html; see also Elisabeth Semel, Reflections on Justice John Paul
Stevens's Concurring Opinion in Baze v. Rees: A Fifth Gregg Justice Renounces Capital
Punishment, 43 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 783, 793 (2010) (detailing Justice Stevens'
jurisprudential evolution from "narrowing" to outright abolition).
178. Baze, 553 U.S. at 78 (Stevens, J., concurring).
179. Justice Stevens posited in Baze that theories like incapacitation and deterrence
were not necessarily adequate or demonstrably effective justifications for the death
penalty. Baze, 553 U.S. at 78-79 (Stevens, J., concurring). Thus, Justice Stevens
concluded that the only remaining justification for the death penalty was retribution and
that "retribution ... animates much of the remaining enthusiasm for the death penalty."
Id. at 79-80. Singling out retribution is generally utilized as a tactic to discredit any
remaining justification for the death penalty, in light of the Court's continual efforts to
dictate "increasingly less painful methods of execution." Id. at 80.
180. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
181. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Is It Wrong to Commute Death Row? Retribution,
Atonement, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1319, 1335 (2004) (citations omitted)
("Retribution holds that punishment is justified because and only because it is deserved,
and only to the extent it is deserved. Retribution therefore has no end beyond itself Its
only end is doing justice, and justice is done when deserved punishment is imposed.");
see also Bradley, supra note 13, at 21-22 ("[R]etribution tells us little about what a
particular defendant's sentence ought to be, or even how to define a range of acceptable
punishments for a given crime."). Although Mr. Bradley's position is subject to some
criticism from retributivists who might say that the punishment deserved is a policy
decision based partly in retributive justice, his point is well taken: retribution is an
explanation of why society punishes, not necessarily a prescription for the warranted
punishment for specific crimes.
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extinguishment of life. 182  Therefore, retributivism's common
denominator, at least in terms of the convict's pain threshold, is no less
pain than is required to carry out a proportional punishment.
While retributivists may not necessarily concern themselves with
the risk of pain a convicted murderer may experience, that ignorance
cannot stand in the face of a Supreme Court increasingly skeptical of the
death penalty and the methods by which capital punishment is carried
out. The judicial branch's skepticism toward capital punishment,
embodied by the evolving standard of decency test, has resulted in a new
Eighth Amendment edict to limit the risk of pain in executions.183 The
argument has come full circle: because lethal injection is thought to be
"painless"'84 and is regarded by both sides of the death penalty debate as
the most agreeable means to carry out capital punishment due to its
relative humaneness,185 the Court has decided that methods of execution
must be so meticulous as to practically eliminate the risk of pain.186 The
obvious problem, however, is that a risk of pain likely exists in any
method of execution.
For the retributivist death penalty supporter, the focus on the risk of
pain then presents a serious dilemma. The death penalty is in part or in
whole justified by retributivist theory, which does not concern itself with
the pain caused by punishment, except that pain which might be required
to affect proportional punishment. If capital punishment is the
proportional punishment chosen for murder, and most executions carry at
least some risk of severe pain, then the retributivist rationale for the
182. For an interesting discussion as to why capital punishment should be more
painful, see Robert Blecker, Killing Them Softly: Meditations on a Painful Punishment of
Death, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 969, 993-98 (2008). Professor Blecker recognizes,
although not without a certain degree of disdain, that most modem retributivists are
happy enough with a relatively anesthetized execution. Id. at 969-71.
183. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 47-48.
184. Id. at 62.
185. Id. at 40.
186. This problem mirrors the truce between death penalty retentionists and
abolitionists. Constantly seeking the "most humane" method of execution has led the
Court to not only prefer lethal injection but essentially mandate its use in capital
punishment regimes. See id. at 104 (Thomas, J., and Scalia, J. concurring). The
concurrence states:
Aside from lacking support in history or precedent, the various risk-based
standards proposed in this case suffer from other flaws, not the least of which is
that they cast substantial doubt on every method of execution other than lethal
injection. It may well be that other methods of execution such as hanging, the
firing squad, electrocution, and lethal gas involve risks of pain that could be
eliminated by switching to lethal injection. Indeed, they have been attacked as
unconstitutional for that very reason. But the notion that the Eighth
Amendment permits only one mode of execution, or that it requires an
anesthetized death, cannot be squared with the history of the Constitution.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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death penalty and the jurisprudence requiring a reduced risk of pain have
come into direct opposition. Because retributivists tolerate the pain
necessary to carry out the death penalty, the retributivist rationale for
capital punishment now conflicts with Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
that commands limiting the risk of pain.
Baze represents the ultimate incarnation of the tension between
retribution and the evolving standard of decency. Justice Stevens'
concurrence encapsulates the jurisprudence seen in lower courts and
brings it to its logical conclusion: a conflict between jurisprudence and
justification, that is, the conflict between the evolving standard of
decency and retribution in method-of-execution challenges. The
problem with Mata, Provenazano, and Baze is not necessarily in their
results, but rather in the sheer inevitability of the result. Through Mata
and Provenzano, one can easily predict the course of future death penalty
litigation: petitioners will focus on the potential for pain and suffering in
the implementation of the death penalty. If the risk of pain becomes
unacceptable to an Eighth Amendment analysis, so too does the death
penalty.
III. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RETRIBUTION AND THE
DIGNITY OF MAN IN METHOD-OF-EXECUTION JURISPRUDENCE
Having identified the essential tension in Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence between the retributive justification for the death penalty
and a test that inquires into the risk of pain caused by execution, the next
step is to identify potential solutions to the Eighth Amendment
conundrum. In that respect, the concurring opinion of Justices Thomas
and Scalia in Baze provides the best option for resolving the
retribution/humaneness paradox. Whether Baze holds nothing at all or
establishes the constitutional floor for lethal injection procedure
alternatives,1 7 a modified Thomas-Scalia position represents the
resolution of an untenable conflict in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
A modified Thomas-Scalia position does suffer from some flaws,
however, most notably the opinion's reliance on pre-incorporation case
law.
187. The holding in Baze (as with most of the Court's death penalty jurisprudence) is
at best unclear and at worst wholly indiscernible. See Marceau, supra note 149, at 209.
The distinct possibility remains that the only holding in Baze was that the death sentence
of the petitioner was affirmed. Id. at 213-14. If that is the case, an intentional harm test,
like that proposed by Justice Thomas, may yet be adopted by the Court. If the opinion of
Chief Justice Roberts carries the weight of a precedential test, it should be modified or
overruled.
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A. The Thomas-Scalia Concurrence, Modified
Resolving the paradox between retribution and humaneness cannot
be achieved through the Roberts plurality in Baze. Justice Thomas'
concurrence provides a golden opportunity to, at least, dull the contrast
between the asserted justifications for the death penalty and the
continuing efforts of the courts to discern the most humane method of
capital punishment. By adopting this position, the Supreme Court could
both end the paradox and respect the right of the states to choose whether
capital punishment is appropriate for the people of those states. That
said, the Thomas concurrence requires a slightly broader application in
order to be functional: the state should be barred from causing
intentional pain, but also from acting with knowing indifference to the
potential pain caused by execution.
Justice Thomas' position, in which Justice Scalia concurred,
asserted that states should only be barred from causing intentional pain
through execution.88 The opinion is based partly on originalism, and
partly on previous method-of-execution challenges.89 Justice Thomas'
opinion departs from that of the other plurality supporters in that the
Court's most conservative Justices view the challenge in Baze not as a
question regarding an evolving standard of decency, but one involving
simply the precedential value of other like cases involving challenges to
execution methods such as electrocution and the firing squad.190 The
application of the evolving standard of decency test to a method of
execution was an arguably novel interpretation of Supreme Court
precedent.'9'
In previous method-of-execution challenges, the Supreme Court
merely required that methods of execution not be "inhuman[e] and
barbarous" or involve "torture and lingering death."'' 92 To meet those
188. Baze, 553 U.S. at 94 (Thomas, J., and Scalia, J., concurring).
189. Id. at 94-95, 99-101.
190. Indeed, Baze is more akin to the challenges in Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130
(1879), In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890), and Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 459 (1947), discussed supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text, than it is to
Furman, Gregg, or the like. Not at issue are the problems in Furman or Gregg: legal
procedural protections for condemned murderers. Instead, the question is about
Kentucky's procedure in implementing lethal injection. The constitutional question
raised in Baze is one that goes to the heart of the constitutionality of lethal injection as a
method of execution.
191. Baze, 553 U.S. at 101 (Thomas, J., and Scalia, J., concurring).
192. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447. The reliance on Wilkerson, In re Kemmler, and
Resweber is usually attacked due to the age of those cases and their failure to consider
new tests established in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Baze, 553 U.S. at
116, (2008) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("Whatever little light our prior method-of-
execution cases might shed is thus dimmed by the passage of time."); Denno, supra note
132, at 668-72. The author is not aware of any court precedent purporting to establish a
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standards, a method of execution must involve more than the "mere
extinguishment of life." '193 Justice Thomas' concern with the substantial
risk test was that the Roberts position interprets the Eighth Amendment
to essentially permit "only one method of execution" and "requires an
anesthetized death."'94 Justice Thomas noted the primary concern for
death penalty supporters: the Constitution is apparently evolving so
quickly that lethal injection, hailed recently as "the humane alternative"
is under attack as cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.'
95
The only result of the Eighth Amendment's evolution, wrote Justice
Thomas, is that the Court will eventually strike down capital punishment
"as cruel and unusual in all circumstances."'' 96
As opposed to Chief Justice Roberts' substantial risk of significant
harm test, the Thomas-Scalia position would require the state to only
avoid intentionally inflicting pain. The intentional pain analysis would
ensure that retribution and the evolving standard of decency could co-
exist without collision. In effect, the intentional pain test would end the
inquiry into the risk of pain and shift the analysis to the intent of the state
in choosing a particular method of execution. Thus, the Supreme Court's
inevitable slide into finding that the death penalty, on its face, creates a
substantial risk of significant harm to every condemned inmate would be
halted.
However, the Thomas-Scalia intentional harm test does not go far
enough in limiting the possibility of harm. Because Justice Thomas does
not describe his definition of intentional, the possibility remains that
under the intentional harm test the state might not be barred from
pursuing methods of execution known to cause pain. For instance, a
state might settle on a lethal injection protocol not because it was meant
to cause pain, but despite the fact that it inflicts pain-a sort of depraved
indifference.197  If the Eighth Amendment's protections are to mean
anything with regard to methods of execution, both intentional and
reckless punishments must be banned.
Recent attempts to reintroduce antiquated methods of execution
provide perhaps the most apt example of the need for modification to the
per se shelf life on Supreme Court precedent. That said, the method-of-execution cases
cited are pre-incorporation and are therefore technically dicta with regard to the
application of the Eighth Amendment to the states. This potential problem is discussed
infra at notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
193. In reKemmler, 136 U.S. at447.
194. Baze, 553 U.S. at 104 (Thomas, J., and Scalia, J., concurring).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 105.
197. The author is indebted to Professor Mannheimer of Northern Kentucky
University's Chase College of Law for his endless help with the entirety of this project
and, particularly, with this fine distinction.
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Thomas-Scalia position. Assume that a state decided to adopt
electrocution as its primary means of execution in light of increasing
scrutiny regarding two-drug protocols and extreme shortages of
commonly-used lethal injection drugs. The state is not adopting the
method of execution to cause pain, but merely to carry out lawful
sentences in light of the aforementioned pressures. Under the Thomas-
Scalia test, as long as the subjective intent of the state in utilizing the
electric chair was not malicious, Old Sparky could continue its deadly
work. Assume also that the state is aware that the electric chair, as a
good deal of evidence seems to indicate,1 98 causes significant and
potentially excruciating pain to the condemned. The result is not a
pleasant one: states may choose potentially gruesome methods of
execution despite their known dangers. This result, therefore, cannot be
said to comport with the evolving standard of decency.
A better standard would have the state avoid both intentional and
reckless harm to the inmate. After all, the state should avoid
"unnecessary and wanton" harm to inmates.99 Such a test would also
keep states from adopting unproven methods of execution despite
potentially serious flaws. Most importantly, this modified position is a
functional middle ground between the retributivist's lack of concern for
inmate comfort and necessary constitutional protections. A modified
Thomas-Scalia position would ensure that retribution could remain a
constitutional justification for the death penalty, as some pain-the pain
necessary to carry out the deserved punishment-would remain tolerable
under the Eighth Amendment. The intentional harm test also ensures
that states would not go beyond the necessary infliction of pain to
implement grotesque and torturous methods to satisfy the retributivist
goals of capital punishment. States could maintain a retributive justice
position on capital punishment: namely, that the state 'is neither
concerned with causing unnecessary pain nor making death painless,
only with carrying out the retributive aim of the death penalty.00
Finally, the Thomas-Scalia position ensures that primacy in determining
the validity of the death penalty would remain with the states.
B. Potential Flaws in the Thomas-Scalia Position
The Thomas-Scalia intentional pain test (and the modified test
proposed here) suffers from at least one potential flaw. The decision
relies heavily on originalism and stare decisis to reach its conclusion that
198. See Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413, 422-42 (1999) (Shaw, J. dissenting);
see also Denno, supra note 132, at 673-79.
199. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
200. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
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the Eighth Amendment was never intended to limit the risk of pain in
execution. The position largely ignores recent Supreme Court cases
interpreting capital punishment challenges under the rubric of the
evolving standards of decency and instead relies on the few decisions in
Supreme Court history that directly address a method-of-execution
challenge. The problem with relying on those cases is not the
originalism inherent in such an application, but rather the precedential
value of those cases.
Originalism strikes a chord with many as an intuitive and common-
sense method of interpreting constitutional provisions. The argument is
as follows: if the Founders meant one thing when they wrote the Eighth
Amendment, who are we to attempt to change its meaning?201 Justices
Scalia and Thomas have made a name for themselves for endering what
they believe to be decisions faithful to the vision of the Founding
Fathers.20 2 How successful they have been in rendering ostensibly
originalist decisions, however, is another matter entirely.
Notwithstanding criticism from jurists and commentators who disagree
with the fundamental originalism paradigm and its application to the
Eighth Amendment,0 3 both Justices Scalia and Thomas have been
roundly criticized for various failings in applying an originalist view of
the Constitution to the Eighth Amendment. For instance, both venerable
Justices have previously disagreed that the Eighth Amendment contained
201. For an overview of several originalist perspectives, see generally Lee J. Strang,
The Challenge of and Challenges to, Originalism, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 111 (2013)
(reviewing GRANT HUSCROFT & BRADLEY W. MILLER, THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM:
THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (2011)). The criticisms of originalism
are well-documented, to the extent that an in-depth discussion is not necessary. For a
detailed deconstruction of originalism, see generally Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is
Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009).
202. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628-29 (2008) (holding
that gun laws restricting firearm ownership violated the Second Amendment, based
heavily on an originalist interpretation of the Second Amendment); see also Scalia
Defends Originalism as Best Methodology for Judging Law, U. VA. SCH. L. (Apr. 20,
2010), http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2010-spr/scalia.htm.
203. An originalist interpretation of the Eighth Amendment and the evolving standard
of decency do not necessarily run in opposite directions. For instance, traditional
retributivist ideals in line with originalism comport with the evolving standard of decency
in cases like Atkins and Roper. An originalist understanding of the Eighth Amendment
which deems execution to be manifestly constitutional does not preclude rational
limitations on the state's ability to mete out punishment to those who lack sufficient
culpability. See supra notes 43-67 and accompanying text (discussing limits on the
imposition of the death penalty on particular classes of offenders in accordance with the
retributivist culpability requirement for punishment). Even if originalism and the
evolving standard occasionally conflict, originalism often gets closer to the mark in
interpreting the Eighth Amendment. This is especially true when considering whether a
particular method of execution meets the Eighth Amendment standard.
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a proportionality requirement2°4 -a view out of line with both
originalism and retributivism. The originalist undertone of the Thomas
concurrence may open the door for criticism from within the originalist
camp, but a closely related issue in the opinion is more likely to raise
some eyebrows.
As previously mentioned, the Thomas concurrence relies on cases
such as In re Kemmler to support the intentional pain test. These cases
are interesting in their discussion of the Eighth Amendment but are not
technically precedential. Wilkerson, In re Kemmler, and Resweber were
all decided before the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Eighth
Amendment.°5 Thus, the Eighth Amendment discussions in those cases
were dicta, at least when applied to state methods of execution. While
this point may delight those who appreciated the Roberts concurrence, it
does little to justify the complete lack of treatment given those cases by
most of the opinion-writers in Baze. Although the cases are certainly
old, and not binding precedent, they do carry some persuasive value
206
and point out the critical flaw in Baze. Before Baze, the evolving
standard of decency test had never been applied to a method-of-
execution challenge. Whether cases like Wilkerson establish mandatory
precedent is therefore a red herring. The real issue at hand in Baze was a
novel application of the evolving standard of decency to methods of
execution.
Whether or not Justices Thomas and Scalia were correct in their
application of originalism to methods of execution under the Eighth
Amendment, their intentional pain test may be criticized because it relies
on cases that are partly dicta. This criticism, while valid, does little to
detract from the overall point of the decision: the application of the
evolving standard of decency to methods of execution has no basis in the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. To the extent that their conclusion
relies on an originalist understanding of the Constitution, Justices
204. See Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Cruel and Unusual Federal Punishments,
98 IOWA L. REv. 69, 94 n.160 (2012); Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment
Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 511-12 (2012).
205. See generally Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879). The Eighth
Amendment was officially incorporated about 15 years after Resweber in Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
206. Even Professor Denno is careful not to say that cases such as In re Kemmler are
completely lacking in precedential value. While Professor Denno is very critical of the
usefulness of In re Kemmler, and questions the rationale of the decision that defers
heavily to the New York Legislature and suffers from a dearth of actual information
about electrocution, she stops short of declaring its complete uselessness a persuasive
authority. See Denno, supra note 132, at 669-71. In Baze, Chief Justice Roberts was
also seemingly reluctant o dismiss previous method-of-execution cases entirely. See
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 48-49 (2008).
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Thomas and Scalia have succeeded in remaining faithful to a
fundamental understanding of "cruel and unusual" in the Eight
Amendment context, as evidenced by reliance on early decisions such as
Wilkerson and In re Kemmler.
CONCLUSION
Retributivists and death penalty abolitionists agree on one thing:
lethal injection is the most acceptable method of carrying out a death
sentence. The reasons for their respective support highlights the problem
with Eighth Amendment jurisprudence: retributivists support lethal
injection because it is thought to be the least susceptible to constitutional
attack, and abolitionists support it because lethal injection is thought to
be the "most humane" method of execution. In Baze v. Rees, the
inevitable Eighth Amendment collision between retribution and the
evolving standard of decency was realized. Lethal injection came under
attack, and Justice Stevens' concurring opinion called into question the
very constitutionality of lethal injection. The intractable conflict
between retributive justice and humaneness in capital punishment, which
will play out in death penalty litigation for the foreseeable future,20 7 is
yet another paradox created by the Court's own jurisprudence. In order
for capital punishment to survive in its current form under an
increasingly rigorous Eighth Amendment microscope, a modified test
based in part on the intentional pain test posited by Justices Thomas and
Scalia should be adopted.
207. The U.S. Supreme Court will consider yet another challenge to lethal injection
protocols in Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1173
(2015) (mem.), which will test the use of the drug midazolam in three-drug protocols.
Florida's highest court recently imposed a moratorium on executions in that state pending
the decision by the Supreme Court in Warner because Florida utilizes the same three-
drug protocol. See Tracy Connor, Florida Execution of Jerry Correll Put Off Until
Supreme Court Rules, NBC NEWS (Feb. 18, 2015),
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/lethal-injection/florida-execution-jerry-correll-put-
until-supreme-court-rules-n308266.
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